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Abstract 
Previous research provides conflicting evidence regarding the effects of prior 
experience on estimates of task duration. Research supporting the planning fallacy 
suggests that people tend to ignore information about their previous task performance, 
whereas other work indicates that time estimates are influenced by the duration of a 
just-completed similar task. The present research examined whether information about 
previous tasks was linked to temporal misestimation on subsequent tasks. Experiment 1 
revealed that the accuracy of completion time predictions on an anagram task was 
influenced by the degree of misestimation in the perceived duration of the preceding 
task. In Experiment 2, prospective estimates were found to exceed actual time, whereas 
the direction in which predictions were misestimated (under or overestimation) differed 
according to the duration of the just-completed task. These findings suggest that task-
related information is not only used when predicting task duration but also affects 
temporal misestimation. This research is discussed in the context of bias in predictions 
of task duration and the allocation of attentional resources in dual task situations in the 
prospective time estimation paradigm. 
 
Keywords: time prediction bias; temporal misestimation; prior task experience; 
planning fallacy; prospective and anticipated time estimates; attention to temporal and 
non-temporal information. 
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The process of estimating how much time an upcoming task will take to complete 
has been the focus of considerable research (e.g., Buehler, Griffin, & Ross, 1994; 
Byram, 1997; Josephs & Hahn, 1995). Such research has found that people are 
generally over-optimistic, that is, they tend to underestimate their task completion 
times. A closely-related and well-established cognitive judgement phenomenon is the 
planning fallacy, which was initially identified by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
Kahneman and Tversky found that experts (e.g., stockbrokers) were over-optimistic 
when predicting their task completion times despite being aware that previous similar 
activities had taken longer than they had anticipated.  
 
Kahneman and Tversky propose that two distinct types of information are 
available to people when predicting task duration: distributional information, which 
concerns performance on previous similar tasks (e.g., previous task completion times); 
and singular information, which relates to the task at hand (e.g., the amount of work 
involved in task completion). Kahneman and Tversky suggest that the planning fallacy 
occurs because people treat the current task as a unique event, which is disassociated 
from previous similar activities. Thus, time predictions tend to be based on singular 
information at the expense of distributional information, which is ignored. 
 
The applicability of the planning fallacy beyond the realm of expert judgement is 
evident in research where short (i.e., a few minutes) and long duration (i.e., several 
weeks) novel and familiar activities are performed in naturalistic and laboratory 
settings. For example, Buehler et al. (1994) found that students tended to underestimate 
the amount of time needed to complete their final year college dissertation. The 
temporal underestimation indicative of the planning fallacy has also been observed in 
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the laboratory on tasks such as self-assembly furniture and paper folding (Byram, 
1997). Likewise, Buehler, Griffin, and MacDonald (1997) found evidence of an 
optimistic time prediction bias on an anagram task. Buehler et al. suggest that the 
prospect of receiving a financial reward that was dependent on the speed of task 
completion motivated participants to underestimate task duration.  
 
Although there is considerable evidence that people underestimate (and are thus 
inaccurate when judging) task duration, recent research indicates that such over-
optimism may not be as prevalent as previously thought. Using short duration 
laboratory tasks (e.g., the Tower of Hanoi), Thomas, Newstead and Handley (2003) 
found evidence of pessimistically biased time predictions (i.e., the overestimation of 
task duration), with an optimistic judgement bias being mediated by the duration of the 
just-completed task.  
 
Thomas et al. found that temporal underestimation only occurred on longer 
duration tasks when a shorter version of the same task was completed beforehand. There 
was also evidence of temporal overestimation being greater on shorter tasks when a 
longer duration task was performed beforehand. These findings led Thomas et al. to 
suggest that the anchoring and adjustment judgemental heuristics (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1982) might be applicable to the time estimation process. That is, time 
predictions were based (or anchored) on the perceived duration of the just-completed 
task, with insufficient adjustment for the greater or lesser demands of the upcoming 
task.  
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A plausible explanation for these findings is that temporal misestimation occurs 
because of bias or error relating to the previous task. That is, the perceived duration of a 
recently-completed task is likely to be different from the actual duration when people 
possess no objective feedback about their completion times. Using such erroneous 
information as a basis for estimating the duration of an upcoming similar task would be 
expected to lead to inaccurate predictions. Moreover, if time prediction bias is 
influenced by the perceived duration of a previous task, the completion time of the 
preceding task relative to the duration of the upcoming task may also predict the degree 
of bias in temporal judgements. A key aim of Experiment 1 was to investigate whether 
time estimates given at the end of a previous similar task were linked to the accuracy of 
predictions on a current task. Specifically, Experiment 1 examined whether the degree 
of bias in previous temporal estimates carries forward to subsequent time predictions.  
 
Experiment 1 
In this study, participants performed six trials of an anagram task, which involved 
identifying three smaller words from the letters of one longer root word. Participants 
estimated their completion time immediately before starting each trial and immediately 
after finishing it. Having to give a time estimate at the end of each trial forced 
participants to think about the just-completed task, thus making task-related information 
salient in working memory (Zakay, 1989). Consistent with the findings of Thomas et al. 
(2003), it was hypothesised that information about the previous task (e.g., its perceived 
duration) would form the basis of time predictions on the current task. Hence, it was 
anticipated that there would be a link between the accuracy of the subsequent time 
prediction and information concerning the just-completed task. 
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Method 
Participants. Fifteen (11 female and 4 male) students at the University of 
Plymouth participated voluntarily and were paid £2.50 each. No biographical 
information other than gender was recorded. 
Materials. Each trial of the anagram task was presented on a sheet of A4 paper, 
which contained three 11-letter root words with three solid horizontal lines beneath each 
word. The task involved identifying three words (each comprising at least four letters) 
from each root word and writing them on the paper. One of the root words was 
improvement, from which can be derived a number of four-letter words such as rope, 
time, and vine. Each trial entailed identifying a total of nine words. A digital stopwatch 
was used to measure task duration. 
Design and Procedure. A one factor (task) repeated-measures factorial design 
comprising six levels was used (i.e., trials 1 vs. 2 vs. 3 vs. 4 vs. 5 vs. 6). Participants 
gave spontaneous verbal estimates of task duration. As trial 1 served as a practice trial, 
participants estimated the duration of the upcoming task on trials 2 to 6 only. However, 
participants estimated the duration of the just-completed task on each of the six trials. 
Since participants were aware that they had to estimate task duration at the beginning of 
the study, judgements given at the end of each trial were labelled prospective time 
estimates in accordance with the terminology used in research into time perception (e.g., 
Block & Zakay, 1997; Brown, 1985; Macar, 2002). Temporal judgements given before 
the start of each trial were termed anticipated time estimates or time predictions. The 
order in which the trials of the anagram task were performed was held constant, with 
participants undertaking all six trials in the same sequence. 
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Participants were tested individually. After being briefed about the experimental 
rationale, participants were asked to remove their watches and place them out of sight. 
The task instructions were then presented, and participants were informed that they had 
to verbally estimate how much time it would take them to solve a series of anagrams. 
Participants were then informed of the nature of the task, and began performing the first 
trial once they understood what was required of them. The stopwatch was then activated 
and was stopped once participants had completed each trial. Before the second and 
subsequent trials, participants predicted the duration of the upcoming task, and after 
each of the six trials they gave a prospective time estimate. Both types of time estimate 
were given in seconds. Each testing session lasted approximately 30 minutes. 
 
Results 
As a measure of temporal judgement accuracy, time index scores were calculated 
by dividing actual by estimated completion time per participant on each trial. Time 
index scores have been used extensively in research into time perception (e.g., Brown, 
1985), and provide a valid method for assessing time estimation accuracy as a function 
of task duration. That is, they are comparable over temporal intervals of different 
durations. Index scores that are greater than one are indicative of temporal 
overestimation, whereas scores of less than one denote temporal underestimation. Index 
scores of one are indicative of perfect time estimation accuracy. Basic descriptive 
statistics are presented in Table 1.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The Effects of  
 - 8 - 
The majority of the anticipated and prospective time index score means were 
greater than one, suggesting that there was a general tendency for participants to 
overestimate task duration. The only descriptive evidence of temporal underestimation 
occurred on trial 3, where the mean time index score derived from anticipated estimates 
was less than one (M = .90). In order to ascertain whether temporal judgement accuracy 
differed according to the type of time estimate, time index scores were subjected to a 
paired-samples t-test. This revealed that anticipated time estimate scores were 
significantly greater than prospective time estimate scores across all trials (Ms = 1.27 
and 1.12, respectively), t(14) = 2.47, p < .05 (two-tailed). Since the mean of the 
prospective scores was closer to one than the mean of anticipated scores, participants 
were more accurate at judging their completion times after rather than before the trials. 
 
In order to determine the kind of information that was used when predicting task 
duration, the relative influence of information concerning the previous trial was 
examined. A series of multiple regression analyses were conducted using two predictor 
variables. One predictor was time index scores derived from prospective estimates on 
the previous trial. The other predictor was successive task discrepancy scores, which 
measured the magnitude of difference between sequential tasks (i.e., the amount of time 
each trial took relative to the previous trial in the sequence). Successive task 
discrepancy scores were calculated by subtracting the duration of each target trial from 
the duration of the previous trial. Both predictors were regressed onto time index scores 
derived from anticipated estimates on each of the five target trials. 
 
Regression test statistics are presented in Table 2. The regression models 
accounted for high proportions of variability in anticipated time index scores on the five 
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target trials (Adj. R2s > .73). Prospective time index scores on trials 1 to 5 were found to 
be significant predictors (ts > 6, ps < .01, two-tailed), suggesting that the magnitude of 
inaccuracy in anticipated estimates on each of the target trials was linked to the extent 
of bias in estimates given at the end of the just-completed trial. Successive task 
discrepancy scores were found to be significant predictors of anticipated time index 
scores (ts > 4, ps < .01, two-tailed) on three out of the five target trials (i.e., trials 2, 4 
and 5). 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Discussion 
These findings indicate that the extent to which anticipated time estimates were 
biased was linked to the degree of inaccuracy in prospective time estimates on the 
preceding trial, and the actual duration of the target trial relative to that of the previous 
trial. There was a tendency to overestimate task duration whether temporal judgements 
were made before or after each trial. The direction in which anticipated time estimates 
were biased is consistent with Thomas et al.’s research (2003), which produced 
evidence of temporal overestimation on other short duration laboratory tasks. The 
present findings demonstrate that the extent of temporal misestimation on a just-
completed task transfers to anticipated time estimates on an upcoming task. The 
observed relationship between previous prospective and subsequent anticipated time 
estimates concurs with Thomas et al.’s suggestion that information such as the 
perceived duration of previous similar tasks is taken into account when predicting task 
completion times. 
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Although there is evidence that task-related information is considered when 
making subsequent time predictions, it is not known whether such findings will occur 
when individuals have greater experience of the to-be-completed task. The lack of prior 
experience of the anagram task could well explain the present general temporal 
overestimation. That is, participants tended to err on the side of caution because they 
were uncertain of what the upcoming task entailed. Consistent with this suggestion, 
there is evidence that individuals engage in defensive pessimism in order to bolster self-
esteem when their task performance will be objectively evaluated (e.g., Norem & 
Cantor, 1986). Hence, it may be that participants engaged in defensive pessimism in 
order to appear competent at solving each set of anagrams. In order to further examine 
the issue of prior task experience, the number of practice trials of the anagram task was 
increased in Experiment 2.  
 
In relation to prospective time estimates, the attention allocation model of time 
perception (Thomas & Weaver, 1975) would predict the occurrence of temporal 
underestimation in the present study. That is, solving each set of anagrams occupies 
cognitive capacity and thus limits participants’ ability to monitor the passage of time, 
which results in prospective time estimates being shorter than actual task duration 
(Brown, 1997). Thomas and Weaver’s model of psychological time states that time 
estimates are derived from the output of temporal and non-temporal information 
processing mechanisms in the brain, which compete for attentional resources. Hence, 
when a task is performed during a time interval, attentional resources are divided 
between the processing of temporal and non-temporal information (Hicks, Miller, Gaes 
& Bierman, 1977).  
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Consistent with Thomas and Weaver’s model, there is considerable evidence of 
prospective time estimates being shorter than the actual duration of temporal intervals 
when various tasks are performed simultaneously (e.g., Burle & Casini, 2001; Franssen 
& Vandierendonck, 2002; Macar, Grondin & Casini, 1994). Such temporal 
underestimation has been attributed to the inability to store sufficient temporal 
information (e.g., time cues) in working memory when performing a non-temporal task 
during a time interval (Brown, 1997). It has also been suggested that task performance 
occupies much of the individual’s cognitive capacity leaving few attentional resources 
available to monitor the passage of time (Curton & Lordahl, 1974). 
 
Whilst it is not known why temporal overestimation (instead of temporal 
underestimation) was evident in prospective time estimates here, participants 
undoubtedly performed two tasks simultaneously before giving a judgement at the end 
of each trial. That is, they had to try to keep track of time whilst solving each set of 
anagrams. Thus, attentional resources would have been divided between monitoring 
temporal cues and completing each trial. Extrapolating from previous research (e.g., 
Brown, 1985), the misestimation of task duration would not be unexpected given such 
sub-optimal attentional processing of temporal information. 
 
A key aim of Experiment 2 was to determine whether temporal overestimation 
would prevail in both prospective and anticipated time estimates when these judgements 
were made independently of one another. Experiment 2 also investigated whether 
information concerning previous tasks was linked to the accuracy of prospective as well 
as anticipated time estimates. It may be that prospective time estimates are more 
accurate than anticipated time estimates because the former are based on information 
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such as the perceived duration of the just-completed task rather than on information 
about the previous (i.e., a different) task. Given that prospective estimates were less 
biased than anticipated estimates in the present study, the impact of the type of time 
estimate on temporal judgement accuracy was further explored in Experiment 2. 
 
Experiment 2 
This study used a between-groups design in which participants performed two 
target trials of the anagram task where time was estimated either before (anticipated 
condition) or after task completion (prospective condition). In order to increase the 
amount of prior experience, participants performed two practice trials of the anagram 
task on which no time estimates were requested or given. Four of the six trials from 
Experiment 1 were randomly selected and performed in the same sequence by all 
participants.  
 
Method 
Participants. Thirty (22 female and 8 male) students at the University of Plymouth 
participated voluntarily and were paid £2.50 each. No biographical information other 
than gender was recorded. 
Materials. Trials 1, 3, 5 and 6 from Experiment 1 were employed. A digital 
stopwatch was used to measure task duration. 
Design and Procedure. A 2 (task: trial 3 vs. trial 4) x 2 (time estimate: prospective 
vs. anticipated) mixed factorial design was used. The time estimate factor was 
manipulated between groups, with participants being randomly assigned to one of two 
equal-sized conditions. The task factor was a repeated measure. The procedure was 
similar to that of Experiment 1 except that spontaneous verbal time estimates were 
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given on trials 3 and 4 only (trials 5 and 6 from Experiment 1). Each testing session 
lasted approximately 20 minutes. 
 
Results 
As was the case in Experiment 1, time index scores were calculated per 
participant on each trial where a temporal estimate was given (i.e., trials 3 and 4). Basic 
descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3. Three out of the four time index score 
means were greater than one, suggesting that there was a general overestimation of task 
duration. Scores in the prospective condition were greater than one on both trials, and 
temporal overestimation was also observed in the anticipated condition on trial 4. 
However, there was some descriptive evidence of temporal underestimation in the 
anticipated condition on trial 3, where the mean index score was less than one (M = 
.86). Hence, the direction in which time predictions were biased may have differed 
between the target trials, with temporal overestimation occurring on trial 4 and temporal 
underestimation occurring on trial 3. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
In order to examine the impact of the type of time estimate on temporal judgement 
accuracy, time index scores were subjected to a 2 (task: trial 3 vs. trial 4) x 2 (time 
estimate: prospective vs. anticipated) split plot analysis of variance (ANOVA). This 
analysis produced a main effect of task, F(1,28) = 17.00, MSE = .14, p < .001, with 
overall scores being lower on trial 3 than on trial 4 (Ms = 1.04 and 1.43, respectively). 
There was also a significant interaction, F(1,28) = 4.84, MSE = .14, p < .05. This 
revealed that scores in the prospective condition were higher than scores in the 
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anticipated condition on trial 3, but lower than scores in the anticipated condition on 
trial 4. Pairwise comparisons (LSD t-tests, all two-tailed) revealed that the means of the 
time estimation conditions did not differ significantly on trials 3 or 4 (ts < 1.7, ps > .10). 
However, scores in the anticipated condition were significantly lower on trial 3 than on 
trial 4 (p < .05), whereas scores in the prospective condition did not differ significantly 
between the trials (p > .08). The main effect on the time estimate factor was not 
significant (F < 1, p > .10). 
 
As a further analysis of temporal judgement accuracy, time index scores per trial 
and time estimation condition were subjected to one-sample t-tests (all two-tailed) with 
a test value of one (i.e., perfect temporal judgement accuracy). Results revealed that 
prospective and anticipated time index scores did not differ significantly from one on 
trial 3 (ts < 1.3, ps > .10), whereas the time index scores from both time estimation 
conditions differed significantly from one on trial 4 (ts > 2.5, ps < .05). This finding 
suggests that both types of time estimate were more accurate (i.e., time index scores 
were closer to one) on the first target trial. 
 
Discussion 
 The present study indicates that the direction in which anticipated time estimates 
were biased differed between the two target trials of the anagram task. Specifically, 
participants in the anticipated condition overestimated the duration of trial 4 but 
underestimated how much time trial 3 would take to complete. This finding concurs 
with that of Experiment 1, and suggests that participants based their next time 
prediction on the perceived duration of the just-completed task. 
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Using this kind of task-related information would be expected to result in an 
optimistic time prediction bias on trial 3 given the shorter duration of trial 2. Likewise, a 
pessimistic time prediction bias should be evident on trial 4 given the longer duration of 
trial 3. These results are also broadly consistent with the work of Thomas et al. (2003), 
which revealed that the direction of time prediction bias was influenced by the duration 
of the task that had just been completed. More importantly, the present study suggests 
that individuals do take account of their performance on previous similar tasks when 
predicting task duration. 
 
There was no evidence that prospective time estimates were shorter than the 
actual duration of the target trials of the anagram task. In fact, participants who judged 
their completion time at the end of each trial tended to overestimate the duration of the 
just-completed task. The presence of temporal overestimation in the prospective 
estimation condition contrasts with previous studies, which have found that prospective 
time estimates are shorter than actual duration when non-temporal tasks are performed 
during temporal intervals (e.g., Franssen & Vandierendonck, 2002; Hicks et al., 1977). 
Such research provides support for the attention allocation model of time perception 
(Thomas & Weaver, 1975), and suggests that concurrent task performance occupies 
cognitive resources, which are unavailable to monitor temporal cues (Brown, 1997). 
 
Given such research, it is surprising that in a dual task situation there was no 
evidence of temporal underestimation in the prospective time estimation condition on 
trials 3 and 4 in the present study. This finding concurs with that of Experiment 1, 
where prospective time estimates exceeded actual duration on all six trials of the same 
anagram task. In both studies, attentional resources would undoubtedly have been 
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devoted to solving the anagrams, suggesting that the cognitive processing of temporal 
cues was likely to be less than optimal (Brown, 1997). The presence of temporal 
overestimation implies that participants who gave prospective judgements did not lose 
track of time, but perceived that the just-completed task took longer to finish than it 
actually did. Whilst further research is required to substantiate this suggestion, the 
present findings imply that participants allocated sufficient attentional resources to the 
processing of temporal information whilst solving each set of anagrams. 
 
General Discussion 
The present research indicates that information concerning the duration of a just-
completed task is used when predicting completion times on a version of the anagram 
task originally employed by Buehler et al. (1997). These findings extend the work of 
Thomas et al. (2003) beyond the realm of problem-solving tasks such as the Tower of 
Hanoi to a different type of laboratory task. In general, participants overestimated the 
duration of the previous task and there was some evidence that this pessimistic time 
estimation bias extended to predictions on the current task. That is, the degree of 
inaccuracy in estimates given at the end of the previous task was found to be highly 
predictive of the magnitude of bias in anticipated estimates on the next task (Experiment 
1). The direction in which time predictions were biased also differed between anagram 
tasks of different durations (Experiment 2), a finding that was not explored by Buehler 
et al. (1997). Importantly, the present research demonstrates that, in addition to the 
Tower of Hanoi, there is one other type of short duration task on which optimistically 
biased time predictions are not prevalent. 
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The present studies suggest that, with certain tasks at least, people take account of 
their performance on previous tasks when making time predictions that are inaccurate. 
This finding contrasts with Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) research into the planning 
fallacy, which states that optimistically biased time predictions occur because people 
focus attention on information about the task at hand and ignore information concerning 
previous tasks. Whilst there was a general tendency to overestimate time in the present 
research, anticipated temporal estimates were optimistically biased on longer duration 
tasks when shorter ones had been completed beforehand. That is, when participants 
predicted the duration of trial 4 having just completed trial 3 (Experiment 1) and trial 3 
having just finished trial 2 (Experiment 2). 
 
Contrary to the claim that using such task-related information can attenuate or 
eliminate the planning fallacy (Buehler et al., 1994), the present studies indicate that the 
relative duration of the previous task (rather than task-related information per se) is 
linked to the existence of temporal underestimation. Although it is important to 
ascertain whether these findings generalise to other tasks and settings, the link between 
such distributional information and time prediction bias may not be as clear as 
previously suspected. 
 
There was little evidence of the planning fallacy in the present studies, a finding 
that contrasts with Buehler et al.’s (1997) research. However, the offer of monetary 
incentives dependent on the speed of task completion is a plausible explanation for the 
temporal underestimation observed by Buehler et al. That is, the prospect of receiving a 
monetary reward encouraged Buehler et al.’s participants to focus attention on 
information concerning the nature of the task at hand (e.g., the ease with which certain 
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words might come to mind). Conversely, the absence of any motivational incentives in 
the present research may well have been responsible for the general overestimation of 
task duration that was evident in both studies. Specifically, participants had no incentive 
to make optimistically biased time predictions, and thus erred on the side of caution 
when estimating task duration. 
 
The present research provides further evidence that there are certain tasks on 
which the temporal underestimation indicative of the planning fallacy does not prevail 
(and tends to be reversed). Consistent with the work of Thomas et al. (2003), task 
duration could be an important determinant of temporal misestimation, with an 
optimistic time prediction bias occurring on longer tasks than those used here. Our 
current research lends credence to this notion as we have recently found evidence of 
temporal underestimation on two different types of laboratory task with durations in 
excess of 10 minutes.  
 
Given the present evidence that time predictions are made with reference to the 
perceived duration of previous similar tasks, an alternative interpretation of temporal 
misestimation suggests itself. It could be that although time predictions exceed the 
actual duration of shorter tasks, these estimates may be shorter than the actual duration 
of longer tasks. If people use information about previous tasks to make subsequent time 
predictions, as we suggest, this judgement strategy would lead to temporal 
overestimation on shorter duration tasks and temporal underestimation on longer tasks. 
This interpretation would not only imply that information about previous task 
performance is considered when predicting task duration, but that such information is in 
itself inaccurate. Whilst it is not known whether the present findings generalise to 
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longer duration tasks performed in more naturalistic settings, there is evidence that 
information concerning previous tasks is used when predicting the duration of 
subsequent similar activities. 
 
In relation to the prospective time estimates, there was evidence of temporal 
overestimation on anagram tasks of different durations in both studies. A plausible 
interpretation of this finding is that participants were able to allocate sufficient 
attentional resources to the processing of temporal cues in a dual task situation whereby 
the time interval and the resolution of a non-temporal task occupied cognitive capacity 
(Fortin & Rousseau, 1987; Hicks et al., 1977). The presence of temporal overestimation 
contrasts with previous research (e.g., Zakay, 1989), which has shown that prospective 
time estimates are shorter than actual task duration under such dual task conditions.  
 
Whilst it is unclear why prospective time estimates exceeded actual task duration 
in the present studies, it has been demonstrated that temporal underestimation is not 
always evident in these judgements in dual task situations. In order to further explore 
the impact of concurrent performance of this anagram task on the length of prospective  
time estimates, a control condition should be included in future research. That is, a 
condition in which participants monitor the length of a temporal interval, but do not 
perform the anagram task during this period of time. Given the lack of such a control 
condition, it is perhaps unwise to make too much of the temporal overestimation that 
was evident in prospective time estimates in the present studies. 
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Table 1 
Experiment 1: Means (and standard deviations) of estimated and actual completion 
times (in seconds), and time index scores  
 
Anagram Trial  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Actual Time 
174.93 
(92.71) 
183.67 
(86.10) 
151.80 
(74.29) 
210.87 
(137.37) 
161.47 
(71.69) 
137.67 
(48.14) 
Anticipated 
Estimate 
N/A 
204.67 
(145.88) 
211.33 
(151.95) 
206.33 
(146.20) 
204.33 
(135.21) 
198.67 
(135.94) 
Prospective 
Estimate 
204.33 
(148.36) 
218.33 
(147.78) 
200.00 
(160.40) 
223.00 
(167.24) 
185.67 
(149.80) 
164.33 
(105.91) 
Anticipated 
Index Score   
N/A 
.90 
(.66) 
1.41 
(.95) 
1.10 
(.79) 
1.29 
(.83) 
1.42 
(.96) 
Prospective 
Index Score 
1.07 
(.47) 
1.12 
(.57) 
1.23 
(.75) 
1.07 
(.51) 
1.07 
(.58) 
1.18 
(.68) 
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Table 2 
Experiment 1: Multiple regression test statistics 
 
Task Model 
Adjusted R2 
Prospective 
Time Index 
Score (Previous 
Task) 
Beta 
Weights 
Successive 
Task 
Discrepancy 
Score 
Beta 
Weights 
Trial 2 .86 t(12) = 6.63** .69 t(12) = 4.31* .45 
Trial 3 .73 t(12) = 5.80** .83 t(12) = 1.18  .17 
Trial 4 .74 t(12) = 4.99** .70 t(12) = 4.86** .68 
Trial 5 .85 t(12) = 8.07** .85 t(12) = 5.04** .53 
Trial 6 .78 t(12) = 6.02** .82 t(12) = 2.07 .27 
 
** p < .001 (two-tailed) 
* p < .01 (two-tailed) 
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Table 3 
Experiment 2: Means (and standard deviations) of estimated and actual completion 
times (in seconds), and time index scores 
 
Anticipated Condition Prospective Condition  
Actual 
Time 
Estimated 
Time 
Index 
Score 
Actual 
Time 
Estimated 
Time  
Index 
Score 
 Trial 1 
151.07 
(80.13) 
N/A N/A 
119.27 
(41.41) 
N/A N/A 
Trial 2 
135.47 
(67.56) 
N/A N/A 
114.13 
(36.78) 
N/A N/A 
Trial 3 
203.13 
(86.72) 
175.67 
(82.57) 
.86 
(.47) 
163.27 
(73.69) 
179.73 
(101.02) 
1.13 
(.41) 
Trial 4 
153.27 
(68.79) 
218.00 
(85.21) 
1.42 
(.58) 
115.67 
(45.60) 
154.47 
(75.04) 
1.32 
(.34) 
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